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INVESTING IN WORK: WILKES AS AN
EMPLOYMENT LAW CASE
DEBORAH A. DEMOTT*
INTRODUCTION
The plaintiff’s situation in Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home,
Inc. 1 warrants a fresh look in light of recent scholarship that focuses
on default rules, in particular the presumption that an employment
contract for an indefinite term creates a relationship of employment
at-will.2 This focus furnishes a new vantage point from which to
assess the court’s holding in Wilkes, both in isolation and in contrast
with subsequent cases. The Wilkes court required a controlling
shareholder (whether a single shareholder or an alliance among
several) to demonstrate that a legitimate business purpose justified
terminating the employment of a shareholder in a closely-held cor
poration in which economic return on equity came only through
salary payments, subject to a showing by the discharged employeeshareholder that through means less injurious to him the corpora
tion could have achieved the same business objective.3 If the con
trolling shareholder cannot show a legitimate business purpose for
its action—or, having established such a purpose the shareholderemployee shows the availability of an alternative less injurious than
termination—the termination breaches the controlling shareholder
or shareholders’ fiduciary duty to the discharged shareholder-em
ployee.4 Otherwise, or more generally, an employment of indefi
nite duration (like the plaintiff’s in Wilkes) is subject to a
* David F. Cavers Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law. Thanks to
Mitu Gulati for comments on a prior draft of this article and to Symposium participants
for their reactions and questions.
1. Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 657-61 (Mass. 1976).
2. On default rules generally, see Brett McDonnell, Sticky Defaults and Altering
Rules in Corporate Law, 60 SMU L. Rev. 383, 393-97 (2007) (summarizing literature).
For discussion of scholarship analyzing the employment at-will doctrine as a default
rule, see infra text accompanying notes 65-78.
3. Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 663-64.
4. Id. at 663.
497
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presumption that the relationship is one at-will; either party may
terminate at any time for any reason or for no reason.5
The presumption of employment at-will fits neatly into the cat
egory of legal rules that are defaults, that is, rules the parties may
change by agreeing to an alternate term. Intriguingly, employment
at-will may also fit into the sub-category of default rules that are
“sticky” because either the law makes changing away from the de
fault relatively difficult or, separate from hurdles formally imposed
by the law, parties’ agreements in fact rarely shift away from the
default when doing so would have been optimal for the parties.
Why the latter might be so—a default rule remains unchanged for
reasons unrelated to legally-imposed obstacles to deter change—
has attracted diverse explanations at the level of theory. These in
clude the direct costs of drafting to oust an otherwise-applicable
default rule; cognitive biases, which may stem from misunderstand
ing the substance of the default rule; and the deterrent effects of
anticipating other parties’ reactions to proposing an alternative to
the default.6
One might characterize Wilkes and subsequent cases in Massa
chusetts and other jurisdictions as ousting the default rule of em
ployment at-will and replacing it with a different default rule that,
at least in Massachusetts, contains an irreducible core of mandatory
law. This substitution makes sense to the extent employment atwill in Wilkes and comparable settings represents a sticky default,
not an optimal rule chosen by the parties as a considered regime to
govern their relationship over time as founding investor-sharehold
ers. Data on the extent to which parties to employment agreements
do or do not replace the at-will default with an alternate term bear
on this question. As it happens, although most non-union employ
ment contracts in the United States appear either not to depart
from the at-will default or to adopt it explicitly, in one employment
setting—CEOs of the largest public corporations—the default is al
most invariably replaced by provisions imposing adverse financial
consequences on a party who terminates employment without hav
ing good cause to do so.7
5. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMP’T LAW § 2.01 (Tentative Draft No. 2,
2009).
6. See text infra accompanying notes 99-120.
7. See Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, An Empirical Analysis of CEO
Employment Contracts: What Do Top Executives Bargain For?, 63 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 231, 246-48 (2006).
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This Article begins by introducing the doctrine of employment
at-will and its contemporary operation, and applying the doctrine to
the facts in Wilkes. The point of the exercise is making clear the
impact of Wilkes from the standpoint of employment law. The Ar
ticle next turns to scholarship examining the at-will rule as a default
rule and the circumstances under which a default rule may become
sticky. Against this background, the Article concludes by reexam
ining the holding in Wilkes along with subsequent developments in
Massachusetts and other jurisdictions. These include the implica
tions of buy-sell and comparable provisions in shareholder agree
ments. In the situations to which the Wilkes doctrine applies in
Massachusetts and elsewhere, at-will is more likely to be a sticky
default than in many other employment relationships. Several fac
tors contribute to this conclusion, perhaps most strongly the impon
derable (or un-pondered) question of how effective control over
the corporation’s decision-making may shift in the future.
I. EMPLOYMENT

AT-WILL

A. Terminating an Employee for “Bad Reasons”
In forty-nine states and the District of Columbia, in the ab
sence of an agreement otherwise, employment is an at-will relation
ship that either party may terminate at any time with or without
cause.8 Over the past seventy years, exceptions have softened the
severity with which the at-will rule operates. In the assessment of a
leading scholar of employment law, these exceptions “virtually
decimate[ ]” an employer’s right to fire for “bad reasons,” with the
consequence that the baseline default rule “now co-exists with nu
merous important exceptions—statutory and common law, state
and federal—that prohibit the discharge of employees for particular
bad reasons.”9 The so-called “bad reasons” exceptions generally
support interests that extend beyond any particular employee to
further public interests more generally. Thus, an employer acts
8. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMP’T LAW § 2.01. The exception is Montana, in
which the Wrongful Discharge of Employment Act requires that an employer show
“good cause” to terminate any employee who has completed a probationary period.
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-901 to -914 (2009). No state to date has adopted the Model
Employment Termination Act, approved in 1991 by the National Conference of Com
missioners on Uniform State Laws. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMP’T LAW § 2.01 cmt.
a; Model Employment Termination Act: Adoption Status Map, NAT’L CONF. OF COM
MISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, http://www.nccusl.org/Act.aspx?title=Model%
20Employment%20Termination%20Act (last visited Feb. 1, 2011).
9. Cynthia L. Estlund, Wrongful Discharge Protections in an At-Will World, 74
TEX. L. REV. 1655, 1655 (1996).
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with a “bad reason” when it discharges an employee on the basis of
a status such as race, sex, or religion; or retaliates against an em
ployee who refused to commit a crime, exercised a clear legal right
such as filing a worker’s compensation claim for job-related inju
ries, or performed a legal duty such as serving on a jury.10 How
broadly or narrowly the common law exceptions are formulated
varies across jurisdictions, but their gist seems well-established in
most.11
Were these exceptions to the employment at-will rule the sole
source of law to which Wilkes and his counsel might have looked
for relief, he would not have had a claim against his former em
ployer, the closely-held corporation Springside Nursing Home, Inc.
Based on the court’s recitation of the events that preceded Wilkes’s
termination as a salaried officer, at worst the termination stemmed
from a fellow shareholder’s quest for revenge.12 Wilkes objected to
the price at which another shareholder, Quinn, proposed to buy
property from the corporation and persuaded the other two share
holders to demand a higher price than Quinn “apparently antici
pated paying or desired to pay.”13 Thereafter the Quinn-Wilkes
relationship deteriorated to one of “bad blood” that also “affected
the attitudes of” the other two shareholders toward Wilkes.14
Wilkes notified the others of his intention to sell his shares at a
price based on their appraised value—apparently shareholders in
Springside had not agreed on any mechanism for the remaining
shareholders or the corporation to buy out the shares of a share
holder who wished to exit—and, at the next directors’ meeting,
Wilkes was left off the list of recipients of salaries but Quinn re
ceived a raise.15 Up to that time, all four shareholders received sal
aries in equal amounts, which increased over time as the business
10. Id. at 1659, 1661.
11. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMP’T LAW § 4.01 cmt. a (noting that “[a] con
sensus has emerged in recent decades that recognizes a cause of action in tort for
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy”).
12. The other shareholders also chose not to re-elect Wilkes as a director. See
Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 661 (Mass. 1976). A person
is not an employee of a corporation solely because the person serves as a director. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. f(2) (2006) (stating that directors hold
original undelegated powers that stem from their election to office, not delegation from
shareholders; “[a] director may, of course, also be an employee or an officer (who may
or may not be an employee) of the corporation, giving the director an additional and
separate conventional position or role as an agent”).
13. Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 660.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 660-61.
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became profitable.16 Each shareholder had an assigned area of
functional responsibility (maintenance of the nursing home’s build
ing and grounds for Wilkes).17 Two months later, at a shareholder’s
meeting, Wilkes was not re-elected as a director or officer, and
“[h]e was further informed that neither his services nor his presence
at the nursing home was wanted by his associates.”18
Thus, Wilkes’s employer, the corporation, likely terminated his
employment in a culmination of ill-will toward him that originated
from his dispute with one fellow shareholder, grew when he an
nounced his wish to sell his shares, and then became more genera
lized. These circumstances are far from the factual underpinnings
of “bad reasons” exceptions to employment at-will. For starters, in
a four-owner corporation in which all shareholders also work as
employees, animosity toward one shareholder-employee may so
destabilize business operations and decision-making that it could
constitute a good (or at least neutral) reason for termination. Addi
tionally, his fellow shareholders’ animosity toward Wilkes was un
complicated by any public interest comparable to those justifying
the “bad reasons” exceptions to an employer’s right to fire an em
ployee at-will.19
B. Overcoming the Presumption of Employment at-Will
As a default rule, employment at-will is inapplicable if em
ployee and employer agree otherwise, for example by providing
that the employment will be for a definite term or, if for an indefi
nite term, that only with cause may the employment be termi
nated.20 The shareholders in Wilkes had no explicit employment
agreements with Springside.21 Although the court’s opinion
stresses a “long-standing policy” that employment by the corpora
tion (and a directorship) “would go hand in hand with stock owner
ship”22 and notes that “[a] guaranty of employment”23 is a
fundamental reason for investing in a closely-held corporation, the
16. Id. at 660.
17. Id. at 660 n.8.
18. Id. at 661.
19. Accord King v. Driscoll, 638 N.E.2d 488, 493 (Mass. 1994) (holding that ter
mination of employment because shareholder participated in derivative suit was not
wrongful because underlying dispute concerned only corporation, not broader public
interests).
20. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMP’T LAW § 2.02 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2009).
21. Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 661.
22. Id. at 664.
23. Id. at 662.
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Wilkes shareholders did not formalize or explicitly articulate either
the policy or a guaranty of employment. A softer norm or practice
of continued employment is not an agreement that suffices to over
come the presumption of at-will employment. Indeed, the gap be
tween norms that operate informally within an organization and a
legally-enforceable agreement that ousts the operation of the at-will
rule is well known to judges, legal scholars, and practitioners.24
Distinct from a bilateral agreement departing from the rule of
at-will employment, in many jurisdictions the at-will presumption
may be overcome by an employer’s promise to limit termination,
thus inducing detrimental reliance by an employee.25 In Massachu
setts, such a promise must embody a “[p]articularly explicit expres
sion[ ] of intent” on the part of the employer to bind it to an
employment “contract of extraordinary duration,” that is, any dura
tion other than one at-will.26 It is not evident whether the “longstanding policy” to which the Wilkes court referred27 had the requi
site specificity because the opinion does not detail either the pol
icy’s terms or how it was documented or otherwise expressed.
Likewise, in many jurisdictions (including Massachusetts) a
policy statement unilaterally made by an employer—typically in a
manual or other document distributed to employees—may also cre
ate an enforceable variation away from the rule of at-will employ

24. On the difference between informal norms in internal labor markets and le
gally effective agreements, see Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, The Enforce
ability of Norms and the Employment Relationship, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1913, 1917
(1996) (observing that “[i]n non-union workplaces, a clear norm exists that an employer
will not discharge an employee without cause”). Rock and Wachter argue that courts
generally should not enforce such norms because formal legal enforcement would not
usefully add to self-enforcement. Id. at 1917-20. This argument has been criticized
because it ignores the possibility “that the absence of formal agreements may reflect
serious contracting problems, rather than a state of efficient contracting.” Walter
Kamiat, Labor and Lemons: Efficient Norms in the Internal Labor Market and the Pos
sible Failures of Individual Contracting, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1953, 1954 (1996).
25. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMP’T LAW § 2.02(b). In some states, promis
sory estoppel is not an available basis upon which to counter the presumption of em
ployment at-will. See City of Midland v. O’Bryant, 18 S.W.3d 209, 215 (Tex. 2000). In
some states, the statute of frauds may also preclude the use of promissory estoppel
when the employer’s promise was not memorialized in writing. See McInerney v. Char
ter Golf, Inc., 680 N.E.2d 1347, 1352 (Ill. 1997).
26. See Sioufi v. Youville Rehabilitation & Chronic Disease Hosp., No.
CA9204003, 1994 WL 879990, at *2 (Mass. Super. Ct. June 27, 1994) (holding that a
letter from an employer containing job offer with no expressly stated duration for em
ployment was insufficiently definite expression of intent).
27. Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 664.
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ment.28 Some courts treat such unilateral employer statements as
instances of unilateral contracts;29 others apply general estoppel
principles.30 In Wilkes, Springside may not have formalized or doc
umented its employment policies—for non-shareholder employees
as well as its shareholder-employees—as would an employer with a
larger work force and the corresponding need “to deal[ ] with a
large number of similarly situated employees” and “communicate
the terms of the employment relationship” throughout its
workforce or specific segments of it.31
C. Economic Good Faith 32
If an employer discharges an employee to evade its obligation
to pay compensation for already-completed services or to prevent
vesting or accrual of employee rights and benefits, the employer
breaches the contractual implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing.33 Although some jurisdictions do not recognize this appli
cation of the covenant,34 Massachusetts was early to adopt it in, as it
happens, a case decided one year after Wilkes. In Fortune v. Na
tional Cash Register Co., the employer discharged the plaintiff, a
salesman whose contract assured him of bonuses as commissions
based on the price of products he sold within his geographic sales
territory.35 The contract also made explicit that the plaintiff’s em
ployment was at-will.36 Under the contract, 75% of the bonus
amount was payable to the plaintiff if the territory was assigned to
28. See O’Brien v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 664 N.E.2d 843, 847 (Mass. 1996)
(stating that personnel manual may impose obligations on employer); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF EMP’T LAW § 2.04.
29. See, e.g., O’Brien, 664 N.E.2d at 848.
30. See, e.g., Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 292 N.W.2d 880, 908 (Mich.
1980).
31. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMP’T LAW § 2.04 cmt. a.
32. I owe this terminology to J. Hoult Verkerke, An Empirical Perspective on
Indefinite Term Employment Contracts: The Just Cause Debate, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 837,
844 (1995).
33. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMP’T LAW § 2.06(c).
34. See, e.g., Morriss v. Coleman Co., 738 P.2d 841, 851 (Kan. 1987); Sanchez v.
The New Mexican, 738 P.2d 1321, 1324 (N.M. 1987); cf. Sabetay v. Sterling Drug, Inc.,
506 N.E.2d 919, 922 (N.Y. 1987) (“‘[N]o obligation can be implied . . . which would be
inconsistent with other terms of the contractual relationship in which the law accords
the employer an unfettered right to terminate employment at any time.’” (quoting
Murphy v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 448 N.E.2d 86, 91 (N.Y. 1983))). For a limited
application of the covenant in New York, see Wieder v. Skala, 609 N.E.2d 105, 110
(N.Y. 1992) (holding that covenant was violated when law firm discharged associate
attorney for action taken in compliance with rules applicable to the legal profession).
35. Fortune v. Nat’l Cash Register Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251, 1253-54 (Mass. 1976).
36. Id. at 1253.
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him at the time the products were delivered to the customer; 100%
if the territory was assigned to the plaintiff at the times of both
delivery and installation of the products; and no bonus was payable
under some circumstances on products shipped after eighteen
months from the date of their sale.37 Two months after the plaintiff
was credited with a $5 million sale of equipment,38 the plaintiff re
ceived a notice terminating his employment but was told to “‘stay
on’” in a support position.39 The employer eventually paid the
plaintiff 75% of the bonus due, paying the remaining 25% to an
other employee who helped to install the equipment.40 The court
held that the employer breached the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing through its termination of the plaintiff although the
employer complied with the contract’s explicit terms.41 In the
court’s assessment, the employer overreached, attempting to de
prive the plaintiff of a portion of a commission due him, acting
analogously to a “principal [who] seeks to deprive [an] agent of all
compensation [due the agent] by terminating the contractual rela
tionship when the agent is on the brink of successfully completing
[a] sale.”42
Thus, under Fortune, as in cases in which an employee is dis
charged for a “bad reason,” the employer’s motivation determines
whether the termination is wrongful.43 However, when breached,
the Fortune standard and its counterparts in other states support a
37. Id.
38. Under the terms of the contract, the sale entitled him to a bonus of
$92,079.99. Id. at 1254.
39. Id. (quoting the termination notice).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 1255.
42. Id. at 1257. A prominent academic defender of the at-will rule criticized the
holding in Fortune as “wrong in principle.” Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Con
tract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947, 981 (1984). Professor Epstein characterized the
contract’s structure of commission payments as “represent[ing] a rough effort to match
payment with performance where the labor of more than one individual was necessary
to close the sale,” and “not simply one where a strategically timed firing allowed the
company to deprive a dismissed employee of the benefits due him on completion of
performance,” noting that the company itself “kept none of the commission at all.” Id.
This critique ignores Fortune’s entitlement to 100% of the commission had the pur
chaser been within his territory at the times of both delivery and installation, regardless
of whether installing the equipment required the assistance of others.
43. New York, which does not recognize the tort of employer discipline or dis
charge in violation of public policy, recognizes that a discharge may be the basis for a
claim of breach of an implied-in-law obligation of good faith and fair dealing. See
Wieder v. Skala, 609 N.E.2d 105, 108 (N.Y. 1992) (recognizing implied-in-law contract
claim where law firm discharged associate attorney after associate insisted firm comply
with code of professional responsibility applicable to lawyers).
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claim for breach of contract, not a tort claim or a Wilkes claim for
breach of fiduciary duty.44 Nonetheless, Wilkes and Fortune are
doctrinally complementary. To be sure, the underlying structure of
the parties’ relationships in Wilkes did not utilize performance trig
gers for economic rewards or other arrangements comparable to
the payment of sales commissions or bonuses. But the two plain
tiffs’ situations were not so dissimilar. Like the plaintiff in Fortune,
Wilkes would receive the full benefit of his investment and involve
ment to date in Springside only so long as he remained a salaried
employee.45 Although, as suggested above, the reasons behind the
termination of Wilkes’s employment were not “bad reasons” for
employment-law purposes, the court’s holding requires a motiverelated showing of “legitimate business purpose” to justify depriv
ing the plaintiff of the continuing condition—employment—requi
site to receiving economic returns from the corporation.46 On the
other hand, under the Wilkes standard, an employee-shareholder’s
entitlement to continued employment lacks the absolute and un
conditional character of a successful contract claim under Fortune.
D. Parties and Claims
Underlying structural features also distinguish claims for
breach of fiduciary duty from claims based on the employment-law
doctrines described above. Employment law presupposes a rela
tionship structured between two parties—employer and em
ployee—who owe each other rights and duties. In Wilkes, in
contrast, the employer’s identity was in practical terms fluid over
time because Springside’s governance encompassed the plaintiff as
a director and officer up to the rupture of his relationships with his
fellow shareholders. Thus, employment law’s assumed separation
between employer and employee becomes clouded when the em
ployee in question is himself part of the employer-entity’s central
organs of governance and decision-making. Indeed, in portions of
employment law outside the scope of this Article, shareholder-di
rectors who are not mere employees are ineligible for statutory pro
tections applicable only to “employees.”47
44. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMP’T LAW § 2.06 cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 2,
2009).
45. Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 664 (Mass. 1976).
46. Id. at 663.
47. Many such disputes involve professional firms. See, e.g., Clackamas Gastro
enterology Assocs. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 449-50 (2003) (articulating test for determin
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As a consequence, claims governed by Wilkes differ from the
employment-law claims discussed above. In Wilkes, although Spr
ingside was a named defendant, the judgment ran against the plain
tiff’s fellow shareholders (or their estates), not Springside itself.48
That is, the court held that the other shareholders breached their
fiduciary duties to Wilkes, not that Wilkes’s termination breached a
duty owed him by the corporation itself.49 In contrast, typical em
ployment-law claims focus on whether the employer itself breached
its duties to an employee, while any judgment runs against the
corporation.
However, other claims asserted in more typical employmentlaw cases are similar to those governed by Wilkes. Plaintiffs in
wrongful-termination cases often allege separate claims against su
pervisors and other co-employees responsible for the termination,
alleging intentional and wrongful interference with the plaintiff’s
contractual relations with the corporation.50 Many courts have held
that this cause of action may be based on an at-will contract.51 If
successful, the plaintiff has a claim against individual actors within
the employer’s organization whose conduct led to the plaintiff’s dis
charge by their common employer, comparable to Wilkes’s claim
against his former fellow shareholders. To be sure, the elements
that comprise the tort of wrongful interference are not identical to
the components of breach of fiduciary duty. In particular, the tort
of wrongful interference requires showing that the defendant acted
with an improper motive or used improper means to effect the in
terference,52 while breach of fiduciary duty does not require show
ing whether individual is an “employee” for purposes of applicability of federal
Americans with Disabilities Act and similar statutes administered by EEOC).
48. Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 664-65.
49. Id. at 663-65; see also Merola v. Exergen Corp., 668 N.E.2d 351, 352 n.2
(Mass. 1996) (holding that former shareholder-employee’s claim of breach of fiduciary
duty ran against corporation’s controlling shareholder, not corporation).
50. For a Massachusetts example of a tortious interference claim against a co
employee, see O’Brien v. New Eng. Tel. & Tel. Co., 664 N.E.2d 843, 845-46 (Mass.
1996).
51. See, e.g., Finley v. Giacobbe, 79 F.3d 1285, 1295 (2d Cir. 1996) (applying New
York law). But cf. Ingle v. Glamore Motor Sales, Inc., 535 N.E.2d 1311, 1313-14 (N.Y.
1989) (cautioning that “plaintiff [must not] be allowed to evade the employment at-will
rule and relationship by recasting his cause of action in the garb of a tortious interfer
ence with his employment”).
52. The Restatement definition of the cause of action for tortious interference
with contract is:
One who intentionally and improperly interferes with the performance of a
contract (except a contract to marry) between another and a third person by
inducing or otherwise causing the third person not to perform the contract, is
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ing that the defendant either acted with a particular motive or used
particular means.53 Additionally, if an alleged tortfeasor acts within
the course and scope of employment to obtain the plaintiff’s dis
charge from employment, the tortfeasor may act as the employer
itself. This bars a wrongful interference claim because a party can
not tortiously interfere with its own contract.54 Nonetheless, the
fact that claims that may arise against individual defendants in dis
putes governed by employment law parallels the structure of Wilkes
claims against individual shareholders—not the corporation—for
breach of fiduciary duty.
II. DEFAULT RULES, WHETHER

OR

NOT STICKY

A. Efficient Solution, or Sticky Default?
Traditional scholarly accounts of the at-will rule critiqued or
defended it in theoretical terms. Critics of the rule emphasized its
unfairness to employees when increasingly specialized work bound
them to their employers, which left employees vulnerable to over
investing human capital in a particular job without much prospect
of employment mobility.55 To its critics, the at-will rule stems from
and reinforces a basic power imbalance between employers and
employees56 and ignores the importance of workers’ stakes in their
jobs as tantamount to conventional forms of property.57 Defenders
subject to liability to the other for the pecuniary loss resulting to the other
from the failure of the third person to perform the contract.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 (1977). The Massachusetts standard requires
that the defendant have acted with “actual malice” toward the plaintiff. King v. Dris
coll, 638 N.E.2d 488, 495 (Mass. 1994) (quoting Boothby v. Texon, Inc., 608 N.E.2d
1028, 1040 (Mass. 1993)). Personal gain and personal dislike generally do not meet this
standard. Id.
53. Under the Restatement (Second) of Torts, “[o]ne standing in a fiduciary rela
tion with another is subject to liability to the other for harm resulting from a breach of
duty imposed by the relation.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874. This formu
lation does not require showing the fiduciary’s motive, just that the fiduciary’s conduct
(which may consist of inaction) breached its duty to the beneficiary.
54. See, e.g., McGanty v. Staudenraus, 901 P.2d 841, 847 (Or. 1995). Courts vary
in how they formulate the elements of a privilege to interfere with a fellow employee’s
contract. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.01 note e (2006) (collecting and
summarizing cases).
55. See Lawrence E. Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On
Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404, 1404-05
(1967).
56. See PAUL WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: THE FUTURE OF LABOR
AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 48-104 (1990).
57. See Mary Ann Glendon & Edward R. Lev, Changes in the Bonding of the
Employment Relationship: An Essay on the New Property, 20 B.C. L. REV. 457, 474
(1979).
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of the rule emphasized employee mobility via markets for labor,
plus labor-market constraints on employers who might otherwise
discharge employees arbitrarily or for foolish reasons.58 Addition
ally, the discretion the rule confers on an employer enables it to
react over the course of an employee’s tenure and to terminate a
heretofore hard-working employee who begins to shirk from
work.59 Moreover, by protecting an employer’s exercise of discre
tion, the at-will rule spares the employer the prospect of after-the
fact judicial review of its decision to discharge an employee as well
as the before-the-fact costs of record-keeping and other documen
tation that would follow a change away from the at-will rule.60
More theoretically, and more in tension with the predicament
of a shareholder-employee like Wilkes, at-will employment con
tracts have been characterized as “fully bilateral, so that the em
ployee can use the contract as a means to control the firm, just as
the firm uses it to control the worker.”61 That is, just as an em
ployer is free to threaten (and effect) termination, so is an em
ployee. However, full bilaterality would require that the employee,
once discharged, be free of remaining ties to the employer, else the
employee’s threat to quit would fall short of a mechanism for con
trol over the employer. Employees who also make illiquid equity
investments in their employer may, like Wilkes, have an enduring
tie to the employer that the employee cannot sever through unilat
eral action. This weakens or vitiates any employee empowerment
that might otherwise stem from the bilateral character of an at-will
relationship.62
B. Terms in Employment Contracts
Three recent scholarly developments bear directly on Wilkes:
(1) studies that examine the extent to which employers and employ
58. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 329-330 (4th ed.
1992).
59. See Stewart J. Schwab, Life-Cycle Justice: Accommodating Just Cause and
Employment at Will, 92 MICH. L. REV. 8, 8-12 (1993).
60. See Jeffrey L. Harrison, The ‘New’ Terminable-at-Will Employment Contract:
An Interest and Cost Incidence Analysis, 69 IOWA L. REV. 327, 331 (1984). Nonetheless,
to the extent employment at-will is subject to any exceptions, such as the “bad reasons”
exceptions discussed supra note 9, an employer has an incentive to document its reasons for terminating an at-will employee.
61. See Epstein, supra note 42, at 957.
62. A buy-sell agreement can mitigate the risk that a former employee will re
main a locked-in investor in equity that pays no dividends. See infra notes 141-143 and
accompanying text.
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ees either adopt an at-will rule in explicit terms or agree to oust the
at-will default for another rule; (2) studies that explore the accuracy
with which employees understand the law, in particular the law of
wrongful discharge; and (3) studies that acknowledge the prospect
that the at-will default may not be optimal for all parties who do
not agree otherwise and suggest explanations for its “stickiness” as
a default.63 In general, empirical studies of employment contracts
cast doubt on the assumption that at-will applies universally within
an organization’s workforce, highlight the significance of context,
and suggest that the at-will rule may be a sticky default more often
and for a more complex set of reasons than heretofore believed.
1. The Prevalence of Employment At-Will
Theoretical defenses of at-will employment as a default rule
emphasize not just its bilateral character but its universality within
an organization’s non-unionized workforce; outside the precincts of
tenured faculty within universities and governmental workers with
civil-service protections, the same rule is assumed to apply to all
within an organization.64 Although employment at-will is widely
assumed to be the dominant rule in non-union employment set
tings,65 only scant empirical data confirmed this assumption until
the mid-1990s.66 Verkerke’s 1995 study, using data collected
through surveys of employers, found that 52% of surveyed employ
ers contracted explicitly for at-will employment relationships, while
33% had “no documents that specify the terms governing dis
charge.”67 About one employer in seven, or 15%, had documents
requiring “just cause” for termination.68 Thus, although at-will by
far dominated as the applicable rule, a not insignificant minority of
employers (15%) could not discharge an employee without just
cause.69
Also of interest are the formal means through which employers
contracted with employees: 61% of employers contracted through
an employee handbook, while only 12% addressed in employment
63. See text accompanying infra notes 99-120.
64. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 42, at 977. Epstein’s article was noted in Stewart
J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, An Empirical Analysis of CEO Employment Con
tracts: What Do Top Executives Bargain For?, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 231, 232 (2006).
65. See, e.g., Rock & Wachter, supra note 24, at 1930.
66. See Verkerke, supra note 32, at 865 (describing prior sources of empirical
data).
67. Id. at 867.
68. Id.
69. Id.
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applications the circumstances under which an employee might be
discharged.70 Few (4%) employers used form contracts issued to
individual employees, while only 5% stated discharge terms in of
fers of employment.71
Verkerke’s study found no significant variation across U.S. ju
risdictions.72 However, contracting behavior varied systematically
with employer size; small employers were twice as likely to use no
documentation on point and were somewhat more likely to include
“just cause” terms.73 Large employers were most likely to explicitly
contract for at-will relationships.74
These findings undergird Verkerke’s reaffirmation of at-will as
the default rule.75 Numerically, for most employers surveyed, atwill governed employment relationships either because the default
rule was not ousted or, as for 55% of the employers surveyed, be
cause the relevant contract explicitly adopted the rule.76 Thus, the
at-will rule could be characterized as a “majoritarian” default, that
is, a term replicating the outcome that most parties would choose
through an explicit agreement.77 Shifting the default rule to require
a showing of just cause to discharge an employee—based perhaps
on the perception that employees misunderstand their legal
rights78—would generate no additional information through em
ployee-employer bargaining beyond that already evident through
employee handbooks.79
2. Whether Employees Understand Employment Law
Offsetting somewhat the normative charge to be drawn from
Verkerke’s data is a later study finding that employees misunder
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 868.
73. Id. The study used the size of a workforce to define employers’ size. Small
employers had fewer than fifty employees, midsize employers 50 to 249 employees, and
large employers more than 250 employees. Id. at 868 n.132. That small employers did
not use documentation may stem from the fact that they “often have no formalized
personnel function.” Id. In contrast, “midsize employers . . . more often have person
nel managers, and large employers . . . almost always have specialized managers and . . .
the cost of developing personnel policies can be spread over a larger number of employ
ees.” Id.
74. Id. at 868-69.
75. Id. at 913.
76. Id. at 867.
77. Id. at 913.
78. Id. at 886.
79. Id. at 913.
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stand the at-will default rule, overwhelmingly believing that the law
requires a showing of just cause to justify discharge.80 Using survey
data, Pauline Kim’s 1999 study found that “misunderstanding of the
at-will rule is widespread.”81 For example, 82.2% of the respon
dents to Kim’s survey thought an employer could not lawfully dis
charge an employee solely to save costs.82 Respondents’
misperceptions of the lawfulness of discharge persisted once the
survey instrument added a clear disclaimer that the employer “re
serve[ed] the right to discharge at any time, for any reason, with or
without cause.”83 To Kim, the strongest explanation for this pattern
of erroneous understanding is the prevalence of extra-legal norms
that forbid discharging an employee without cause.84 Additionally,
employee misperception persists over time and in the face of ob
served or experienced terminations, which suggests that mispercep
tion may be reinforced by employees’ attachment to jobs they
already have and from which they can benefit from invested effort
over time only if the employment relationship is relatively secure.85
80. See Pauline T. Kim, Norms, Learning, and Law: Exploring the Influences on
Workers’ Legal Knowledge, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 447, 459 (1999).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 457.
83. Id. Once presented with the disclaimer, 74% of Kim’s respondents continued
to believe that a discharge motivated purely by cost-savings would be illegal. Id.
84. Id. at 494-95; see also Rock & Wachter, supra note 24, at 1914-18 (exploring
extra-legal norms that constrain discharge within organizations). Pauline Kim’s study
calls into question the salience to the employment context of Ellickson’s canonical
study of the operation extra-legal norms within rural communities. See ROBERT C.
ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991). The
communities Ellickson studied were close-knit ones that afforded ample opportunities
to enforce sanctions for conduct that contravened a community norm through repeat
interactions among community members. Id. at 56-59. In contrast, Kim characterizes
employment as more like a relationship between a power plant and a coal mine, typi
fied by explicit specification in legally-effective form of the parties mutual and obliga
tions. Kim, supra note 80, at 502. This is because
[i]f one focuses on the decision to join the firm, rather than the myriad of
minute, ongoing adjustments in terms, the employment relationship appears
more like a one-shot transaction than a repeat-play situation. Moreover, for
the career employee, whose sunk investments render her increasingly vulnera
ble to employer opportunism over time, the stakes may be very high indeed.
Id. Additionally, and in contrast to the communities studied by Ellickson whose mem
bers are embedded in relationships implying ongoing interactions, “the . . . norm forbid
ding discharge without cause by definition comes into play at the end of the
relationship,” and a violation of the norm ends the relationship. Id. at 503 (emphasis
omitted).
85. Kim, supra note 80, at 496. Employees may also misunderstand and underestimate the rights the law confers on them. See Mitu Gulati et al., The New Old Legal
Realism 27 (Duke Law Scholarship Repository, Working Paper, 2010), available at
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2951&context=faculty_
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Whatever the explanation, if “workers overwhelmingly misunder
stand the law’s protections,”86 viewing at-will employment as a re
flection of informed choice on the part of employees does not allay
doubts about at-will as the default rule. At a minimum, it generates
unhappy surprises and perceptions of unfair treatment for at-will
employees discharged without cause.
3. The Terms of CEOs’ Contracts
As it happens, the frequency with which employers and em
ployees agree to employment on terms other than at-will is mark
edly higher for contracts between large corporations and their
CEOs. In a study of CEO employment contracts from 1984
through 2003 (with the bulk of the sample from the late 1990s),
Schwab and Thomas found that “CEOs overwhelmingly contract
around the at-will default standard of termination.”87 Of the 375
CEO contracts in their sample, only twenty-five stated the contract
to be at-will, while most gave the CEO greater (financial) rights
against the company in the event of a termination without cause.88
But twenty-four of the expressly at-will contracts also gave the
CEO greater rights in the event of termination without cause.89
Most contracts—86.93%—ran “for a definite term of years.”90
Definitions of “just cause” in CEO employment contracts most
often listed “willful misconduct, moral turpitude, failure to perform
duties, breach of fiduciary duties, and gross misconduct,” and much
less often sexual harassment (0.53%), incompetence (3.47%), or
substance abuse (4.80%).91 On the other hand, CEOs in Schwab
and Thomas’s sample typically had the right to quit without finan
cial consequences only for “good reason” (a defined term), not sim
ply to pursue greener pastures elsewhere.92
The data assembled by Schwab and Thomas suggest that, at the
least, CEOs “are quite different from other employees.”93 Presum
ably, they argue, CEOs’ contracts protect them against the rigors of
at-will employment “because the value to the CEO of just-cause
scholarship (stating that a sample of casino workers interviewed believed Nevada law
limited their ability to sue under federal anti-discrimination law).
86. Kim, supra note 80, at 506.
87. Schwab & Thomas, supra note 64, at 233.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 234.
93. Id. at 241.
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protection exceeds the cost to the firm” because a firing harms the
CEO’s reputation and other firms, post-firing, will be reluctant to
hire him or her.94 The extra compensation triggered by a non-fault
termination should be calibrated to discourage a CEO from con
duct that would justify discharge for cause.95
Additionally, Schwab and Thomas’s data are consistent with
the exercise of bargaining power by candidates for CEO positions
(and by incumbent CEOs negotiating the terms of a new contract)
and with differences in the texture or structure of processes through
which a contract is formed. The formal qualities of a corporation’s
contract with its CEO differ from the generalized policy statements
in employee manuals that typify the employee handbooks through
which the employers in Verkerke’s study documented their rela
tionships with the run of the mill employees.96 CEO contracts are
the product of individualized deals in which both CEO and com
pany are separately represented by counsel; counsel for the com
pany usually generates the first draft of the contract, a practice
explained by the fact “that these contracts become public informa
tion, which gives the company a strong interest in ensuring that it
does not establish unfavorable future precedents in its negotiations
with other employees or future CEOs.”97 Moreover, represented
by counsel, prospective and incumbent CEOs are, unlike the re
spondents in Kim’s survey, highly unlikely to be misinformed about
the default rule applicable to at-will relationships of employment.
Thus, in this context, at-will employment may not be a sticky
default.
C. Explanations for Stickiness
Even if CEOs are sui generis among employees, the starkness
of Schwab and Thomas’s data should prompt many questions.98 For
example, are CEOs alone in wishing to preserve their reputations
94. Id. at 248.
95. Id.
96. Verkerke, supra note 32, at 867. No study appears to investigate the contractual terms applicable to executive officers other than CEOs.
97. Schwab & Thomas, supra note 64, at 237. Only when a prospective CEO “has
extraordinary negotiating power” would his or her counsel prepare the initial draft. Id.
98. To characterize CEO contracts as stemming from flawed corporate govern
ance processes does not itself answer these questions. For one thing, CEO contracts
adopt an alternative to the at-will default with a near-uniformity missing in other as
pects of large public companies’ contracts with their CEOs, such as compensation struc
tures and pay levels. On governance flaws and CEO compensation, see LUCIAN
BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE 23-53 (2004).
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from the damage any termination may cause? Might it be that lesswell-paid employees would be even more concerned about the af
termath of discharge? Are the terms of CEOs’ contracts closer to
those a well-informed employee would wish and would pursue
through negotiations than the at-will rule documented by most of
the employers in Verkerke’s study? And, as explored below, if de
fault rules sometimes prevail because parties are deterred from ne
gotiating around the rule—in particular, by the prospect that they
will thereby signal bad information about themselves to the other
parties—why are CEOs so uniformly undeterred?
Scholarship examining default rules in a range of contracting
contexts identifies several possible explanations for parties’ failure
to oust a default rule and adopt a term that they prefer. Three gen
eral categories of explanation seem plausible in at-will employment
relationships, including that in Wilkes. These are: (1) the direct
costs of drafting an alternative term; (2) cognitive biases of all sorts,
including misinformation about the substance of the default rule;
and (3) the deterrent impact of anticipating the other parties’ reac
tions if an alternate to the default rule were to be suggested. Wilkes
itself suggests a fourth explanation, specific to founder-shareholders
who are also employees, which is the inevitable risk of fluidity or
indeterminacy in control over their employer.
1. Direct Costs of Drafting to Replace Default Rule
Earlier accounts of stickiness in default rules emphasized the
direct cost of drafting an alternative better tailored to the parties’
specific circumstances.99 Employment may be a context in which
drafting costs and their allocation remain significant. Many em
ployees are not frequent repeat players in negotiating the terms of
their employment, while employers are; and many employees lack
the financial resources to retain counsel to assist them in employ
ment negotiations. Thus, the use of counsel by present and incum
bent CEOs is telling.
Additionally, the facts in Wilkes itself suggest that the parties
made only limited investment of financial resources into legal ser
vices and customized drafting.100 According to the court’s opinion,
after Wilkes acquired an option to purchase the property to be op
99. See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An
Analysis of the Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CALIF. L.
REV. 261, 263 (1985).
100. Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 659-61 (Mass.
1976).
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erated as a nursing home and enlisted three acquaintances as co
venturers, “[he] consulted his attorney, who advised him that if the
four men were to operate the contemplated nursing home as
planned, they would be partners and would be liable for any debts
incurred by the partnership and by each other.”101 As a conse
quence of the attorney’s advice and following consultation among
the prospective shareholders, “ownership of the property was
vested in Springside, a corporation organized under Massachusetts
law.”102 Lawyers, legal advice, and legal drafting play no role in the
remainder of the court’s factual narrative up until the point of the
annual meeting in which Wilkes was not re-elected as a director.103
2. Cognitive Biases and Errors
More recent accounts of stickiness identify a variety of cogni
tive biases that may impede contracting around a default term.104
Parties may exhibit an “endowment effect” through an unwar
ranted attachment to existing legal rules that would lead them to
prefer a default rule regardless of its content.105 The rule’s familiar
ity may induce inertia that the parties do not overcome.106
Ben-Shahar and Pottow tested the thesis of inertial attachment
to default rules in the employment context with a cross-country
comparison using the United States and Canada.107 In general, the
default rule in Ontario (the most populous Canadian province) is
close to the opposite of the at-will default in the United States.108
Although employers in Ontario technically have the power to dis
miss employees, they must make “termination” or “notice” pay
ments to an employee discharged without just cause.109 But
contracts between employee and employer may change these terms,
subject to a mandatory minimum of employee-protective rights.110
Ben-Shahar and Pottow asked Canadian labor lawyers how often
101. Id. at 659.
102. Id.
103. Wilkes, unable to attend the meeting, was represented by his attorney as his
proxy. Id. at 661.
104. For a helpful summary, see Omri Ben-Shahar & John A. E. Pottow, On the
Stickiness of Default Rules, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 651, 655-56 (2006).
105. Id. at 655.
106. For the “inertia effect,” see Russell Korobkin, Inertia and Preference in Con
tract Negotiation: The Psychological Power of Default Rules and Form Terms, 51 VAND.
L. REV. 1583, 1585-86 (1998).
107. Ben-Shahar & Pottow, supra note 104, at 678-80.
108. See id. at 679.
109. Id. at 678.
110. Id. at 679.
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employers opted out of the employee-friendly “just cause” default
and learned that “the same trend of prevalent ‘non-contracting’
that exists under the American experience” also prevails in Ca
nada.111 Indeed, and consistent with some of Verkerke’s findings,
one of Ben-Shahar and Pottow’s lawyer-respondents reported that
“[i]n fact, most ‘contracts’ for employment consist entirely of a onepage offer letter saying, ‘Congratulations, please report to your first
day of work on this day at this pay.’”112
To Ben-Shahar and Pottow, drafting costs are not an adequate
explanation for inertial attachment to the just-cause default given
the simplicity with which a one-page letter could be converted into
“a one-and-a-quarter page letter, with a further sentence setting by
contract the termination benefits.”113 Moreover—and unless radi
cally different explanations for attachment to a default apply in Ca
nada—the fact that Canadian employment contracts depart from
the applicable default norm no more than do counterpart contracts
in the United States does not reaffirm the merits of either
default.114
The “persistent stickiness”115 of the just-cause default in Cana
dian employment contracts also calls into question the weight one
might assign to Kim’s findings of widespread and persistent misun
derstanding on the part of employees about employment law in the
United States.116 One might be tempted to argue that such perva
sive misunderstanding might explain why employees do not more
aggressively seek contract terms other than the at-will default.
However, the parallel persistent stickiness of the just-cause default
in Canadian employment contracts is unlikely to be explained by a
comparable level of misunderstanding on the part of Canadian em
ployers and their lawyers. Moreover, if power imbalances between
employees and employers explain the stickiness of at-will in em
ployment relationships governed by U.S. law, one would expect
that a comparable imbalance north of the border would lead to
more Canadian contracts ousting the just-cause default. Finally,
perhaps the Canadian default rule has proven sticky because it co
incides with an extra-legal norm that requires just cause to termi
111.
112.
113.
114.
in sample
115.
116.

Id.
Id. See generally Verkerke, supra note 32.
Ben-Shahar & Pottow, supra note 104, at 680.
But see Verkerke, supra note 32, at 913 (arguing prevalence of at-will choice
of U.S. employment contracts reaffirms position of at-will as default rule).
Ben-Shahar & Pottow, supra note 104, at 680-81.
See supra notes 80-85 and accompanying text.
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nate employment, perhaps even more sticky than the at-will default
in the United States which may be at odds with extra-legal norms. If
so, the Canadian just-cause default may represent the outcome
many parties would reach through bargaining, as opposed to an in
ertial outcome that requires an explanation such as cognitive bias,
drafting costs, or inhibitions that stem from anticipating other par
ties’ reactions to seeking an alternative rule.
3. Deterrent Impact of Anticipated Signaling Effects
A default rule may also become sticky because a party who
proposes an alternative to the default in contractual negotiations
may signal adverse information about herself, whether or not accu
rately. Fear of this signaling effect may deter willingness to bargain
to alter the default. Kamiat characterized the inhibitory impact of
signaling as an instance of a “lemons” problem of bilateral asymme
tries in information.117 That is, both a prospective employee and an
employer have unique access to information about themselves that
is not readily discoverable by the other. Neither can reliably know,
on the basis of the other’s demand for a contract term, whether the
demand is a reliable signal of (for example) a prospective em
ployee’s propensity to shirk or a prospective employer’s propensity
to discharge its employees arbitrarily or opportunistically.118
Theoretical accounts differ on the significance of signaling ef
fects in the employment-contracting context. Verkerke argues that
signaling effects are symmetrical and cancel each other out: “[j]ust
as prospective employees send an adverse signal by demanding just
cause, so an employer might signal, by demanding an at will rela
tionship or refusing to agree to a just cause term, that it is unusually
likely to discharge workers without cause.”119 Thus, no unequivo
cal implications about an optimal default rule could be drawn from
the signaling phenomenon. In contrast, Ben-Shahar and Pottow ar
gue that signals may not cancel each other out in the employment
context because
it is equally plausible that the employee’s and the employer’s
concerns about negative inferences will compound one another
in a vicious cycle, with the employee worrying about the em
117. Kamiat, supra note 24, at 1958. The “lemons” problem is developed as a
characterization of contracting problems in the market for used cars in George A.
Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84
Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970).
118. Kamiat, supra note 24, at 1958.
119. Verkerke, supra note 32, at 903.
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ployer’s propensity to discharge summarily by insisting on at will
and the employer worrying about the employee’s work ethic by
insisting on just cause.120

Put differently, the signals sent by the prospective employee’s
and the employer’s demands may reduce either’s willingness to put
the issue on the table at all.
Neither account explains why CEOs seem uniformly uninhib
ited by signaling phenomena. Employment contracts with CEOs
may so transcend—and not just in amounts of compensation!—
more mundane employment contracting to warrant sui generis
treatment. Alternatively, perhaps the bargaining leverage of a pro
spective or successful incumbent CEO dominates negative signals
otherwise associated with insistence on a just-cause standard. Ad
ditionally, to the extent that Schwab and Thomas’s data establish
near-uniformity with which CEO contracts opt out of the at-will
default, in that context widespread practice may have created an
alternative just-cause default to be included in a CEO’s contract as
a matter of course. An employer’s decision to omit such a de facto
default from its draft contract could send a strongly negative signal
to a prospective or incumbent CEO, which would be amplified by
the CEO’s counsel when counsel furnishes expert interpretation of
the signal being sent on the basis of counsel’s familiarity with con
ventional practice.
4. Indeterminacy of Employer
At-will employment may also become a sticky default when, as
in Wilkes, the ordinary employer-employee dichotomy is both com
plex and potentially murky. As Springside’s founders, all four ini
tial shareholders contemporaneously became both its employees
and members of its governance structure as officers and directors of
the corporation. As the facts of the case illustrate, this structure did
not assure stability for any one shareholder because a 25% shareholding does not confer control over the board, nor does one seat
on a four-member board. Thus, although Wilkes was initially a co
equal member of Springside’s board, and thus a co-equal partici
pant in his employer’s governance, once his fellow shareholders de
clined to reelect him to the board, he became a non-director
employee-shareholder, whose termination as an employee at the
120.

Ben-Shahar & Pottow, supra note 104, at 678.
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behest of the remaining shareholder-directors followed.121 Al
though formally and as an entity Springside remained Wilkes’s em
ployer throughout, in a more pragmatic sense, its orientation and
allegiance shifted to exclude Wilkes.122
At the outset, all four shareholders—were they to consider the
question—would realize that their participation as investor-employ
ees in Springside subjected each of them to a risk of exclusion from
employment and board membership. The risk materialized many
years later only for Wilkes. Nothing in the court’s opinion suggests
that the four shareholders considered varying through contract ei
ther the at-will default or the corporate-law default of locked-in in
vestment, discussed below. Thus, Wilkes exemplifies the stickiness
of specific default terms with no factual basis to explain the parties’
failure to contract otherwise.
Beyond general explanations for the stickiness of the at-will
default discussed above, another possibility is evident on the facts
of Wilkes. When the four shareholders formed Springside in 1951,
it may not have been evident to them that the control over their
employer could prove indeterminate or fluid over time. Not until
1965 did disagreement set in between Wilkes and Quinn, followed
in 1967 by Wilkes’s exclusion.123 Thus, the risk of exclusion may
well have seemed remote in 1951, sixteen years before it material
ized for Wilkes. Much research investigates the phenomenon of
over-discounting the significance of remote risks.124 Moreover,
raising in 1951 the prospect of a subsequent falling-out may well
have been a negative signal of potential contentiousness that none
of the four shareholders wished to send. That is, the other share
holders might have interpreted the initiative as a signal, not neces
sarily of a propensity to shirk from work as an employee, but as a
signal of an edgy or unduly legalistic temperament. To send such a
signal conflicts with manifesting commitment to a functionally har
monious relationship.

121. Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 659-61 (Mass.
1976).
122. Id. Thus, the court found it unnecessary to determine whether Wilkes’s
“claim is governed by partnership law or by the law applicable to business corpora
tions.” Id. at 661.
123. Id. at 660-61.
124. See, e.g., Estlund, supra note 9, at 413; Bailey Kulkin, The Asymmetrical
Conditions of Legal Responsibility in the Market Place, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 893, 977
(1990).
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SHAREHOLDER-EMPLOYEE DISPUTES RE-EXAMINED

Much in the subsequent evolution in Massachusetts cases ap
plying Wilkes can best be explained by viewing Wilkes as ousting
the default rule of at-will employment in a specific context to re
place it with a different default rule containing an irreducible core
of mandatory law.125 Other jurisdictions that adopted Wilkes like
wise confine its operation to the same context, which is the termina
tion of a founding or substantial shareholder’s at-will employment,
coupled with a lock-in of the shareholder’s illiquid equity invest
ment. In this context, and to these courts, employment at-will is a
sticky default unlikely to represent an optimal choice for the par
ties. Jurisdictions that reject Wilkes may perceive the parties’ fail
ure to oust the at-will default as consistent with their choice of a
rule that is optimal for them, or, more realistically, as a choice that
does not warrant judicial intervention to oust the at-will default be
cause the choice may well be optimal for some who make it. To the
extent a court perceives Wilkes as a generalized threat to at-will as
the employment-law default rule as opposed to a doctrine localized
to an exceptional type of employment relationship, the court may
well reject the Wilkes doctrine.
A. The scope of Wilkes
Subsequent cases sketching in the contours of Wilkes as ap
plied to different facts identify founders like Wilkes as the most
obvious category of shareholder-employees whose discharge trig
gers application of the Wilkes standard.126 In contrast, an employee
at-will “who happens to own stock” falls outside the scope of
Wilkes.127 In Merola v. Exergen Corp., the Supreme Judicial Court
held that “although the plaintiff invested in [the corporation’s
stock] with the reasonable expectation of continued employment,”
his employment was not formally linked to stock ownership, nor
was he a founding shareholder.128 Additionally, unlike Springside,
the corporation did not distribute all its profits to shareholders
through salary payments.129 Thus, by causing the corporation to
125. The Wilkes doctrine is also applicable to controlling members of LLCs, a
point with implications beyond the scope of this article. See Pointer v. Castellani, 918
N.E.2d 805, 815 (Mass. 2009) (affirming judgment in favor of LLC’s former presidentmember; court observed that “[i]t is uncontested that [LLC] is a close corporation”).
126. See infra text accompanying notes 128-136.
127. Merola v. Exergen Corp., 668 N.E.2d 351, 355 (Mass. 1996).
128. Id. at 354.
129. Id.
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terminate the plaintiff’s at-will employment without a legitimate
business purpose, the controlling shareholder did not breach any
fiduciary duty to the plaintiff under Wilkes.130 Along the same
lines, in McLaughlin v. Schenck, the Utah Supreme Court held that,
although shareholders in close corporations owe each other fiduci
ary duties, the duty is not breached by the termination of an at-will
employee who is not a founding shareholder “who created the com
pany with the expectation of employment,” which explicitly ties em
ployment to investment expectations.131
Like the plaintiff in Merola, the plaintiff in McLaughlin joined
the corporation primarily in the guise of an employee, one permit
ted but not required to buy stock.132 Thus, the McLaughlin court
did not evaluate the plaintiff’s discharge under the Wilkes standard
because the discharge did not thwart the plaintiff’s investment
expectations.133
Additionally, the discharge of an at-will shareholder-employee
who falls within the category covered by Wilkes does not always
constitute a breach of fiduciary duty. The other shareholders may
have no alternative less harmful to the discharged shareholder-em
ployee. For example, in Pulsifer v. BitFlow, Inc., the court held that
terminating the employment of “a shareholder who neglects his du
ties or who disrupts company business” does not constitute a breach
of fiduciary duty because “[t]here is no legal requirement to keep a
disruptive or idle employee on the payroll.”134 On the other hand,
when less harmful means could accomplish the overriding business
objective, controlling shareholders breach their fiduciary duty when
they neglect at least to explore them. Thus, in Leslie v. Boston
130. Id. at 355.
131. McLaughlin v. Schenck, 220 P.3d 146, 158 (Utah 2009). Accord Hollis v.
Hill, 232 F.3d 460, 470-71 (5th Cir. 2000) (applying Nevada law). Hollis articulates a list
of non-exclusive factors to aid in identifying the relevant category of shareholders:
[W]hether the corporation typically distributes its profits in the form of sala
ries; whether the shareholder/employee owns a significant percentage of the
firm’s shares; whether the shareholder/employee is a founder of the business;
whether the shares were received as compensation for services; whether the
shareholder/employee expects the value of the shares to increase; whether the
shareholder/employee has made a significant capital contribution; whether the
shareholder/employee has demonstrated a reasonable expectation that the re
turns from investment will be obtained through continued employment; and
whether stock ownership is a requirement of employment.
Id. at 471.
132. McLaughlin, 220 P.3d at 158.
133. Id. at 157-58.
134. Pulsifer v. BitFlow, Inc., No. 974508, 2001 WL 170453, at *19 (Mass. Super.
Jan. 26, 2001).
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Software Collaborative, Inc., the court agreed with the defendants’
opinion that the plaintiff was not a model employee.135 Nonethe
less, as a founding (and one-third) equity investor, the plaintiff had
a right to be treated with the utmost good faith by the defendants,
who appear not to have considered alternatives to discharging the
plaintiff, such as assigning him to other duties or encouraging him
to upgrade his skills.136
B. Wilkes as a Default Rule
When applicable, Wilkes ousts the default rule of at-will em
ployment. In its stead Wilkes imposes a just-cause standard for dis
charge keyed to a legitimate business purpose, against which a
plaintiff may still succeed by showing the existence of means less
harmful through which the purpose could be accomplished.137 Sub
sequent cases make clear that the Wilkes standard is itself a default
rule that may be replaced by terms to which shareholders explicitly
agree.138 In Massachusetts, although such an agreement does not
relieve shareholders of their fiduciary duties to each other,139 the
agreement’s explicit terms may narrow the scope of conduct to
which fiduciary duties apply. Explicitly addressing the circum
stances under which employment may be terminated replaces the
Wilkes default. The plaintiff in Blank v. Chelmsford Ob/Gyn, P.C.
had a written employment agreement providing for an initial oneyear term of employment, “‘continuing thereafter from year to year
until either party shall have given written notice to the other that he
(it) wishes to terminate the contract,’” the notice to be effective in
six months.140 The court acknowledged that such a provision did
not “relieve stockholders of the high fiduciary duty owed to one
another in all their mutual dealings” but held that discharge in com
pliance with the provision, entered into by the plaintiff at the outset
135. Leslie v. Bos. Software Collaborative, Inc., No. 010268BLS, 2002 WL
532605, at *8 (Mass. Super. Feb. 12, 2002). In particular, tensions arose between the
plaintiff and the other two founding shareholders because he felt undercompensated.
Id. at *2. Customers and employees complained about the plaintiff’s “brusque” manner
and ethnic slurs. Id. at *3. Three employees threatened to quit but were dissuaded
when promised higher pay. Id. Inter-shareholder tensions escalated further, culminat
ing in the plaintiff’s threat, communicated via email, that the plaintiff’s wife might shoot
one or both of the other founding shareholders. Id. at *4.
136. Id. at *8.
137. Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 663 (Mass. 1976).
138. See infra text accompanying notes 140-143.
139. See King v. Driscoll, 638 N.E.2d 488, 494 (Mass. 1994).
140. Blank v. Chelmsford Ob/Gyn, P.C., 649 N.E.2d 1102, 1104 (Mass. 1995).
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of employment, gave the plaintiff all for which he had bargained.141
Thus, Wilkes replaces one default rule with another, which the par
ties ousted by agreement in Blank.
Additionally, the corporation’s founding shareholders in Blank
executed a stock purchase agreement providing that the corpora
tion would repurchase their shares at book value upon stated cir
cumstances, including termination of employment.142 The court
held that the purchase agreement eliminated any question about
how the value of the plaintiff’s shares might be determined upon
the termination of his employment; although “[a] duty of good faith
and fair dealing exists during the course of events leading up to and
including termination, [the performance of] that duty is to be evalu
ated in light of” an employment agreement that confers on both
parties a right to terminate without cause.143 Thus, a stock
purchase agreement in itself does not oust the Wilkes default but,
when combined with an explicit employment agreement, narrows—
perhaps as a practical matter eliminates—the range of conduct to
which it applies. In contrast, in King v. Driscoll, in which the plain
tiff had no explicit employment agreement, the fact that the share
holders had agreed to stock buy-back terms did not immunize the
defendant-shareholders from scrutiny under a fiduciary lens of their
conduct that culminated in the plaintiff’s discharge.144
141. Id. at 1106.
142. Id. at 1104-05.
143. Id. at 1106. Blank is an important clarification of the court’s holding in
Evangelista v. Holland, that “[q]uestions of good faith and loyalty do not arise when all
the stockholders in advance enter into an agreement for the purchase of stock of a
withdrawing or deceased stockholder.” Evangelista v. Holland, 537 N.E.2d 589, 592
(Mass. App. Ct. 1989). In Evangelista, the agreement was triggered by a stockholder’s
death, not termination of employment. Id. at 591. Evangelista relied on a footnote in
Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., which stated that “[o]f course, a close corporation
may purchase shares from one stockholder without offering the others an equal oppor
tunity if all the other stockholders give advance consent . . . through acceptance of an
appropriate provision.” Id. at 593 (citing Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328
N.E.2d 505, 598 n.24 (Mass. 1975)); see also Stephenson v. Drever, 947 P.2d 1301, 1305
(Cal. 1997) (holding that unless contract provides otherwise, terminated employee con
tinues to have minority shareholder rights until compliance with valuation provisions in
buy-back agreement). Stephenson interpreted an earlier buy-back precedent, Coleman
v. Taub, 638 F.2d 628, 634-35 (3d Cir. 1981), to “stand[ ] for . . . the proposition that an
employee-shareholder may bargain away his right to remain a shareholder after termi
nation of his employment, and with it the benefits of the fiduciary duty owed by major
ity to minority shareholders.” Stephenson, 947 P.2d at 1309.
144. King, 638 N.E.2d at 494. The court also held that the corporation did not act
wrongfully in discharging the plaintiff because he participated in a shareholder deriva
tive suit challenging the terms of the buy-back plan. Id. at 492-93. The dispute con
cerned matters internal to the corporation and did not implicate broader interests that
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C. Outside Wilkes’s Field of Influence
Jurisdictions that reject Wilkes—most notably Delaware and
New York—reject its linkage between a shareholder’s interests as
an investor and as an employee. In Riblet Products Corp. v. Nagy,
the federal-court jury found that the corporation breached the
terms of its employment contract with the plaintiff, allegedly at the
behest of its controlling shareholders, whom it found also breached
their fiduciary duties to the plaintiff.145 The Seventh Circuit af
firmed the jury’s verdict on the breach of contract claim146 but certi
fied to the Delaware Supreme Court the question of whether
Delaware law recognized the plaintiff’s fiduciary-duty claim.147
Answering the question no, the Delaware court emphasized the
separateness of rights arising from the plaintiff’s employment con
tract and his rights as a shareholder.148 The court conceded that the
corporation’s controlling shareholders “may well owe fiduciary du
ties to [the plaintiff] as a minority shareholder . . . [b]ut that is not
the issue here” because the plaintiff alleged no harm to himself as a
shareholder, such as a wrongful freeze-out or injury to him as a
shareholder stemming from termination of his employment.149 Ad
ditionally, it is clear that under Delaware law the fact that a corpo
ration is closely held does not itself warrant applying a distinct
fiduciary standard to protect non-controlling shareholders.150
underlie public-policy exceptions to employment at-will. Id. at 493. The court explicitly
differentiated between the plaintiff’s wrongful-termination claim and his fiduciary duty
claim and affirmed the trial court’s judgment for the plaintiff on the fiduciary duty
claim. See id. at 494.
145. Riblet Prod. Corp. v. Nagy, 683 A.2d 37, 38 (Del. 1996). The plaintiff alleged
that the controlling shareholders’ motive for firing him was “‘to reduce their risk under
[certain] guarantees.’” Id. at 40 n.4. Presumably, these guarantees are the ones given
to lenders to fund the defendants’ prior leveraged buy-out through which they acquired
an 85% equity interest in the corporation. Id. at 38. The plaintiff, employed as the
corporation’s CEO, was entitled to significant post-termination benefits under his em
ployment agreement unless he was discharged for cause. These were “‘all salaries, ben
efits, bonuses, and other direct and indirect forms of compensation’ for the remainder
of [the] five-year term” of his employment contract. Id.
146. Nagy v. Riblet Prod. Corp., 79 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 1996). The defendants
argued that the plaintiff had been discharged for cause, which would eliminate his right
to significant post-termination benefits. Id. at 574.
147. Id. at 577-78.
148. Riblet Prod. Corp., 683 A.2d at 40.
149. Id.
150. See Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1380-81 (Del. 1993) (stating that it is
“inappropriate . . . for [the] [c]ourt to fashion a special judicially-created rule for minor
ity investors when” corporation has not elected formal treatment as a close corporation
under corporation statute or “there are no negotiated special provisions in the certifi
cate of incorporation, by-laws, or stockholder agreements”).
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Shareholders’ capacity to agree to special terms authorized by the
corporation statute—terms varying default norms in corporate
law—delegitimates intervention by the court to vary the default
terms.151
In contrast, the plaintiff in Ingle v. Glamore Motor Sales, Inc.,
the leading New York case, was an employee at will with no explicit
employment agreement whose stock was subject to a shareholders’
agreement that gave the controlling shareholder the right to
purchase it “‘if [plaintiff] shall cease to be an employee of the Cor
poration for any reason.’”152 The Ingle court held that the plaintiff
had no basis on which to challenge his discharge, although the
plaintiff alleged that it was motivated by the controlling share
holder’s desire to acquire his shares.153 The plaintiff, however, did
not challenge the fairness of the price he received.154
Indeed, under New York law employees at-will who challenge
the fairness of a mandatory stock repurchase fare no better than the
Ingle plaintiff. In Gallagher v. Lambert, the plaintiff alleged he was
fired by his employer so that its controlling shareholders would
benefit through the corporation’s repurchase of his 8.5% sharehold
ing, having timed the plaintiff’s termination so that it fell within the
last month of the period in which the buyback price would be set at
book value.155 The court held that the plaintiff was bound by the
explicit terms of the buy-back obligation, “[t]here being no dispute
that the employer had the unfettered discretion to fire plaintiff at
any time.”156
To the Gallagher dissent, the majority conflated employmentlaw and corporate-law concerns: “[t]he court’s insistence that the
rationale of Ingle . . . must be carried over—lock, stock and bar
rel—even to the fiduciary obligations owed minority shareholders
151. Id. (observing that so to intervene would constitute “inappropriate judicial
legislation” and would violate doctrine of independent legal significance).
152. Ingle v. Glamore Motor Sales, Inc., 535 N.E.2d 1311, 1312 (N.Y. 1989).
153. Id. at 1314.
154. Id.
155. Gallagher v. Lambert, 549 N.E.2d 136, 136-37 (N.Y. 1989). After that
month, the benchmark for the buy-back price was the company’s earnings. Id.
156. Id. at 138. The majority opinion points out that the plaintiff “helped write”
the buy-back formula. Id. at 137. As the dissent notes, the majority opinion does not
examine whether the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing constrains the
controlling shareholder’s exercise of discretion to cause the corporation to terminate
the plaintiff’s employment for reasons unrelated to the corporation’s business needs.
Id. at 141. New York cases do not recognize the covenant’s applicability to arguably
opportunistic decisions to terminate employment. See supra note 34 and accompanying
text.
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in close corporations, plainly represents an extension of the law to a
different jural relationship.”157 In contrast with Wilkes, the NewY
ork court in Gallagher held that the force of New York’s at-will
default may trump even an employee’s interests as an investor.158
To be sure, Gallagher does not convert employment at-will from a
default rule to a mandatory one, but metaphorically it enhances at
will’s gravitational pull or field of force over other issues and le
gally-protected interests.
D. Sticky Defaults Revisited
The possibility that a default rule may be sticky affords a more
theoretical perspective on these differences among jurisdictions, as
well as how the Wilkes doctrine itself evolved. A starting point is
the possibility that courts differ in their assessment of the limits of
human cognition and capacity to address risk through explicit
agreements, as well as the appropriateness of judicial interventions
that reflect awareness of such limitations. Thus, the Delaware posi
tion, which emphasizes the availability of express contractual work
arounds to default rules in corporate law and to the at-will default,159 assumes a robust potential for anticipating or mitigating
risk through explicit terms. If there is a gap between, on the one
hand, the theoretical availability of alternatives to default rules that
the parties to a transaction might prefer, and, on the other hand,
the realistic prospect that those alternatives will be identified and
implemented in enforceable explicit contract terms, Delaware
courts limit their curative role, at least on the issues relevant to this
Article.160 The Wilkes doctrine, in contrast, is a plausible response
157. Gallagher, 549 N.E.2d at 139.
158. Id. at 141.
159. See Rizzitiello v. McDonald’s Corp., 868 A.2d 825, 830 (Del. 2005) (rejecting
argument that plaintiff had been constructively discharged in violation of contractual
covenant of good faith and fair dealing and stating that “[i]n Delaware, there is a ‘heavy
presumption that a contract for employment, unless otherwise expressly stated, is atwill in nature, with duration indefinite’” (quoting E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v.
Pressman, 679 A.2d 436, 440 (Del. 1996))).
160. The court’s holding in Riblet Products has been criticized on the basis that it
“encourages the minority shareholder to take her chances and avoid getting her em
ployment contract in writing.” David A. Grooters, Express Employment Contracts in a
Close Corporation After Nagy v. Riblet Products, Inc.: To Put Them in Writing or Not
To Put Them in Writing, That Is the Question, 24 J. CORP. L. 123, 134 (1998). Although
the author does not spell out the underlying intuition, it might look like this: if a minor
ity shareholder seeks a written employment contract from a corporation with a control
ling shareholder, it might well contain an express at-will term, depending (of course) on
the employee’s bargaining position. With no written contract, if the employee is dis
charged, the employee might be able to establish an enforceable contract on terms
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to default-term stickiness in a relatively small set of transactional
relationships that makes less heroic assumptions about parties’
likely capacity to translate, into enforceable contract terms, insights
theoretically available to them through foresight.
As the Wilkes doctrine evolved through application to addi
tional fact patterns, its scope narrowed to relationships in which the
at-will default may be especially sticky. These are typified by an
employer of indeterminate status, high drafting costs relative to a
risk that seems remote if it is recognized at all, and all in a setting
that may deter explicit bargaining over explicit terms to govern ter
mination of employment. Consider first the indeterminate status of
employers like Springside at the time of its founding. Each of the
four shareholders, now an employee and director as well as an in
vestor, might well not perceive his new corporate employer as dis
tinct from himself and his control over it. In contrast, employees
who join later “and happen to” purchase stock are much less likely
to misunderstand that their employer’s identity and interests are
distinct from their own.
Indeed, although critics of the at-will doctrine emphasize its
origins in a power imbalance between employers and employees,161
implicit in that imbalance is employees’ awareness of it. Participat
ing as a corporation’s founding investor-shareholder may dull this
awareness. Moreover, when a cohort of employees is distinctly em
powered, as appears to be the case with public company CEOs, the
at-will default vanishes. What may differentiate a start-up entity’s
founders from CEOs of public companies is their relative aware
ness of their employer’s identity and interests, as well as possible
changes in the entity’s control structure over time. CEOs, although
much more powerful than the rank-and-file work force in obtaining
terms of employment that they desire, appear also to understand
the vulnerability of their positions to decisions made by the com
pany’s board of directors. Founding shareholders, in contrast, may
lack this awareness or feel it much less acutely, especially if no one
bargains from a distinctly strong initial position.
Relatedly, as the court’s narrative of Springside’s origin sug
gests, founders may have limited funds to invest in any tailored
drafting and, with limits on their own time and energy, choose to
other than at-will. And the absence of a written contract for at-will employment would,
at worst, have no effect on a court’s willingness to link employment status to treatment
of the employee as an investor.
161. See supra note 55 and text accompanying note.
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devote them to their new business as opposed to negotiating ex
plicit default-ousting terms.162 If the risk of discharge from employ
ment seems remote, more remote on the Wilkes facts than the risk
of personal liability were the firm structured as a partnership, the
at-will default may prove sticky.163 Moreover, perhaps a founding
shareholder who considers the question may incorrectly assume
that the law prohibits discharging an employee without cause!
As discussed in Part II.C, theoretical accounts of sticky de
faults suggest that parties may be inhibited from negotiating to oust
a default term because they fear the adverse signals about them
selves that may follow from raising an issue.164 In the Wilkes con
text, the signaling story requires more complexity than the prospect
that by demanding a just-cause standard, a would-be employee sig
nals a propensity to shirk. Founding investors in small corporations
and other entities like Springside who become both employees and
participants in the corporation’s governance have incentives not to
shirk and thereby shortchange themselves as investors. However, a
founding investor who insists on a just-cause standard may signal
undue pessimism about the future of relationships among the foun
ders or an unwelcome suspiciousness about her co-founders.
Thus, the alternate default rule adopted in Wilkes may reflect
the sense that founders who propose a just-cause standard against
an at-will default are more likely to be inhibited than are those who
propose an at-will standard against a just-cause default, who might
characterize the proposal as analogous to no-fault divorce and as a
recognition that sometimes it’s better for all to call a relationship
over, even when no one is culpable. To be sure, a founding investor
who affirmatively proposes adopting an at-will standard may signal
to her fellow investors a propensity for intra-corporate conspiracies
and expulsions. In contrast, proposing a buy-sell agreement could
send a more benign signal, given the breadth of circumstances
under which an initial investor may no longer be a shareholder.
Perhaps—and this is an empirical question—in jurisdictions that
follow Wilkes, buy-back and shareholder purchase rights are more
162. See Harvey Gelb, Fiduciary Duties and Dissolution in the Closely Held Busi
ness, 3 WYO. L. REV. 547, 568 (2003) (observing that at time of founding a new business
entity, “[n]either clients nor their lawyers relished the prospects of incurring the delays
or chilling effects of adversarial negotiations leading to the preparation of intricate legal
documents”).
163. See id. at 567 (observing that “[i]t is probable that in most cases involving
closely-held businesses, the lure of limited liability and partnership tax benefits rather
than entity governance considerations were the prime factors in choice of entity”).
164. See supra Part II.C.
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prevalent than are explicitly at-will employment contracts with
shareholders. Only with the greater purchase that data provides
could the cross-cutting theoretical possibilities of signaling be
untangled.
Finally, Wilkes seems especially compelling as a solution to a
sticky default when equity investment is not allocated in a pattern
that creates a controlling interest that is likely to be stable over
time. The anti-Wilkes faction within Springside that effected his
ouster consisted of an ad hoc alliance among the other three share
holders.165 This alliance did not exist when Springside was founded
and, once it emerged, it might have proved short-lived. In contrast,
when equity is, or has already been, allocated to create a controlling
block of shares,166 a minority shareholder is in a position analogous
to an employee who invests in her employer’s company, knowing of
the power imbalance between them. When equity is equally allo
cated, as in Wilkes, there is no comparable imbalance and the foun
ders are not likely “to conceive of [themselves] as plotting to use
the employment-at-will doctrine against each other.”167 Thus, the
at-will default may be especially sticky because putting an alterna
tive on the agenda for discussion requires imagining how one’s co
founders may discover and indulge their dark sides at some indeter
minate time in the future.
CONCLUSION
Like much contemporary scholarship, this Article uses abstract
theory—the sticky default thesis—both to structure how a situation
is described and to assist in developing a normative account with
which to evaluate the merits of a legal doctrine.168 That the default
rule of at-will employment may be sticky in situations like Wilkes is
a basis on which to consider the merits of the court’s replacement of
at-will with an alternate default. Likewise, the sticky-default thesis
casts a different light on jurisdictions that reject Wilkes by facilitat
165. Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 660-61 (Mass.
1976).
166. An example is the Rodd family block in Donahue. Donahue v. Rodd Elec
trotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 509-10 (Mass. 1975).
167. Gelb, supra note 162, at 567.
168. Even skeptics about the broader merits of particular bodies of academic the
ory may acknowledge the value of a methodology that “yields surprises or insights
about a familiar topic.” Eric A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Contract Law After
Three Decades: Success or Failure, 112 YALE L.J. 829, 831 (2003).
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ing comparative examination of underlying assumptions about pat
terns of conduct and what is feasible in a particular setting.

